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Another Look at the Collapse of Skyline Plaza at Bailey's  
Crossroads, Virginia 
Jeffrey Schellhammer'; Norbert J. Delatte, F.ASCE2; and Paul A. Bosela, F.ASCE3 
Introduction 
On March 2. 1973. the Skyline Plaza apartment bui lding in Bailey's 
Crossrmlds. Virginia collapsed while under construction. The col­
Illpsecxlcndcd vertically through thc building. from the241h 1100rl0 
the ground, leaving an appearance of the structure as tWO different 
high-rise buildings with a gap between them. The collapse tore a 
18-m (60-ft) wide gap through the building a ll the way to thc ground. 
At Ihc li me of the collapse. two pmctically identical RC towers had 
already been built (Kwninctzky 1991. p. 64). Fig. I shows an nerial 
phologmph of thc structure taken shortly before the colJupse. <II about 
t I a.m. on Ihe same day. The collapse occurred at about 2:30 p.m. 
(Leyendecker and Fallal 1977. p. 2). The collapsed structure is shown 
in Figs. 2-4. 
The Americllll Concrete Institute's (AC!) Forlllwork for COli· 
creTe (Hurd 2005 . pp. 2-2- 2-3) cites this case as a "tragic example of 
too-early shore removal." This case study reviews the available 
published infonnation on the case to detemline what lessons can be 
learned. The case is suitable for inclusion in variety of courses in the 
civil engineering and construction curriculum. 
Description of the Structure 
The 26-story apartment building was pan of a $200 mill ion resi­
dential project (Carper 1997. p. 243). The floor plan is shown in 
Fig. 5. The building thllt collllpsed is on the left side of Fig. 5, with 
a parking garage extending to the right. The 118- by 23-m (386- by 
76-ft) building was to be built at a pace orone floor per week (Delatte 
2009. p. 145). Each floor was to be placed in four separate sections 
with a construction joint in the middle. between sections two and 
three. 
The completed structure WllS to be 26-stories tllii. The building 
was to include the 26 stories. a penthouse, and a 4-story basement. 
Each floor was to be 3 m (9 ft ) from top of slab to top of slab. and the 
basement was to be a total of 14 m (40 ft) with the four levels varying 
in height bcclluse of mechaniclli equipment. The first floor elevation 
was to be the same as the roof of the parking garage. which WllS to be 
a green. landscllped llrea. The building was designed to the 1963 
edition of the ACI Building Code Requirements for Reinforced 
Concrete ACI 318-63 (Leyendecker and Fallal 1977. p. 5: ACI 
1963). 
Two different foundation types were used in the construction of 
the complex. The apartment building used a 1.2-m (4-ft) thick mat­
type foundation. whereas the parking gamge used columns on 
footings. The column layout of the apartment bui ldi ng. shown in 
Fig. 5. was the same throughout the structure. The size and strength 
of concrete differed with respect to the height of the structure. The 
compressive strength of the normal weight concrete was to be 34.5 
MPll (5,000 psi) for the columns from the foundation to the seventh 
floor. 27.6 MPa (4.000 psi) from the seventh floor to the seventeenth 
floor. and 20.7 MPa (3.000 psi) from the seventeenth floor to the top 
of the structure. The floor slabs used sand.Jightweight concrete with 
a compressive strength of 20.7 MPa (3.000 psi) (Leyendecker and 
Fatta] 1977. pp. 5- 7). 
Both structures used a flat-plate type of construction. According 
to Wight and MagGregor (2002. p. 6). flat plates are "of uniform 
Fig. 1. Aerial photograph of the structure shortly before the collapse 
(courtesy of NIST) 
Fig. 2. The collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST) 
Fig. 3. Another view of the collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST) 
thickness throughout without drop panels or column capitals. . .Flat­
plate floors are widely used in apartments because the underside of 
the slab is flat and hence can be used as the ceiling of the room below. 
Of equal importance, the forming for a flat plate is generally cheaper 
than that for flat slabs with drop panels or for one-way slab-and­
beam floors.” This meant that the slab itself carried the bending and 
Fig. 4. Close-up view of the collapsed structure (courtesy of NIST) 
shear stresses produced from the respective floor dead and live loads, 
without reinforcing beams. 
Collapse 
Shortly after lunch, some workers observed slab deflections of ap­
proximately 150–600 mm (6 in. to 2 ft) for both the 23rd floor slab 
and the freshly placed 24th floor slab. The freshly placed section of 
the 24th floor slab then fell onto the 23rd floor slab, starting a col­
lapse that continued all the way to the foundation (Schlager 1994). 
Schousboe (1976) described in detail the construction activities that 
occurred on the day of collapse and the condition of the building and 
the parking garage just before the event. The building’s collapse 
removed the edge support from the parking garage, and falling debris 
triggered the failure of the garage. 
The collapse killed 14 workers and injured 34 (Carino et al. 1983, 
p. 35). The area that collapsed is designated as area 3 in Fig. 1. This 
area also contained a crane; as a result, there was a question as to 
whether the crane fell and initiated the collapse, or if it just came 
down with the rest of the building. Once the section of the apartment 
building collapsed, the failure propagated horizontally through the 
attached parking garage. Of the workers killed, 10 were in the tower 
and four in the garage (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 2). 
On March 3, 1973, the New York Times noted, “Six Killed as 
a Crane Drops Through Virginia Building.” The article stated that, 
“Six persons were killed, 34 injured and 14 were reported missing 
today in the collapse of a partly completed high-rise apartment 
building in this suburb of Washington DC.” This article was pub­
lished the day after the collapse. The initial hypothesis was that the 
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Fig. 5. Plan view of the Skyline Plaza Apartment Building and parking garage (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 6)  
crane itself was the cause for the collapse. The article stated, “The a bomb’.” The article also stated that the impact of the collapse 
falling crane broke through the top floors, its weight carrying with it caused the adjoining parking garage to collapse, and that most of the 
layer after layer of concrete to the ground in a ‘domino effect,’ workers that were onsite were working on the garage. In conclusion, 
Lieutenant Diezel said. ‘It made a terrible impact, almost like the article states that, “there were more than 200 workers at the site 
when the collapse occurred, at 2:30 p.m. Some 24 floors of the 
building had already been completed, and the 10 bottom floors had 
been faced with brick” (“Six killed” 1973). 
The next day, another article was published in the New York 
Times stating, “Building Wreckage Will be Dismantled.” This article 
stated that the building “was sliced in two yesterday when a crane 
broke through and crashed floor by floor to the ground in a mass of 
broken concrete and twisted metal. Of 337 men working in the 
building, five are known dead and 34 were injured.” (“Building 
wreckage” 1973). 
National Bureau of Standards Investigation 
Shortly after the collapse, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad­
ministration (OSHA) arrived on the site to investigate. On March 5, 
OSHA requested technical assistance from the National Bureau of 
Standards [NBS; now the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)]. The investigators did not gain access to the 
building until March 5th. This meant that the eastern part of the 
structure had already been demolished, but the NBS report does not 
indicate that this demolition or any of the rescue operations had any 
effect on the investigation (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 2–7). 
The NBS team was asked to answer three questions—the cause 
of the accident, whether there had been violations of OSHA safety 
standards, and if any violations contributed to the collapse. The NBS 
investigators reviewed records from on-site inspections, OSHA case 
records, structural, architectural, and shop drawings, and the results 
of tests on concrete core samples (Carino et al. 1983, pp. 35–36). 
At the time, NBS regularly carried out building failure inves­
tigations when requested by another agency such as OSHA. “The 
bureau limits its investigations to technical matters. It does not 
attempt to trace the source of technical errors or assign blame. The 
bureau sees these technical studies as compatible with its research, 
particularly its development of building design criteria for use by the 
voluntary code groups” (“Bureau’s failure” 1981). 
Construction Process 
Typical floors in the apartment building were placed in four sections 
with an expected speed of one section per day. At such a rate, the 
construction crew could finish one floor per week with 1 day left for 
possible weather delays (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 7). 
Although the previous pace of construction had been one floor 
per week, near the end of February, the pace accelerated to almost 
twice that rate. As a result, when the concrete was being placed for 
the 24th floor, the 23rd floor slab was only 4 days old instead of 
7 days old (Schousboe 1976; Schlager 1994). 
Formwork and Shoring 
The NBS team quickly determined that the condition of the form-
work would be important for the investigation. The ACI Guide to 
Formwork for Concrete (ACI 2004) provides the following defi­
nitions for form, formwork, reshores, and shores: 
“form—a temporary structure or mold for the support of concrete 
while it is setting and gaining sufficient strength to be self-
supporting. 
formwork—total system of support for freshly placed concrete, 
including the mold or sheathing that contacts the concrete and all 
supporting members, hardware, and necessary bracing. 
reshores—shores  placed snugly  under  a  stripped concrete  slab or  
other structural member after the original forms and shores have 
been removed from a large area, requiring the new slab or structural 
member to deflect and support its own weight and existing con­
struction loads to be applied before installation of the reshores. 
shores—vertical or inclined support members designed to carry 
the weight of the formwork, concrete, and construction loads 
above.” 
To determine whether premature removal of shoring or failure to 
install reshoring had caused the collapse, it was necessary to de­
termine what formwork was in place at that time. This proved dif­
ficult. Between the March 2nd collapse and the arrival of the NBS 
team on site, additional reshoring was placed to stabilize some parts 
of the building. Some of the workers’ statements about the status of 
the shoring conflicted with each other. One worker who was in­
stalling reshores on the 21st floor claimed to have heard formwork 
and shoring removal on the 22nd floor at about 2 p.m. Careful 
analysis of photographs taken right after the collapse showed that 
while full shoring remained on the 23rd and 24th stories, it had nearly 
all been removed from the 22nd story in sections 1 and 2, but 
remained in section 4. The condition of the formwork in section 3 
could not be observed because nearly all of this section had col­
lapsed. The engineer’s structural drawings required 2 full stories of 
shoring and 1 story of reshoring while a concrete slab was being cast. 
The NBS team concluded that the estimated location of forms, 
shores, and reshores at the time of the collapse was as shown in 
Fig. 6, with all formwork removed on sections 1–3 of the 22nd floor 
and little if any reshoring on that floor (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, 
pp. 18–31). 
Some workers said that all of the shoring was removed on both 
floors, some said that only some was removed, and others believed 
that all was still in place at the time of collapse (Leyendecker and 
Fattal 1977. p. 18). However, the statements of one worker gave the 
investigators a good idea of the state of the forms at the time of the 
collapse. Leyendecker and Fattal (1977, p. 31) reported “One 
workman indicated that, at the time of the incident, he was placing 
reshores in section 3 of the 21st story and that some reshores were 
present when he started working. Prior to the incident, all the 
reshores fell out (except those in the balcony areas). This is con­
sistent with what would be likely to occur if the forms had been 
removed in the story above.” If the shoring had been removed in the 
22nd floor, the 22nd floor slab would have been relieved of its 
previous loads. With less loading, the deflection would have de­
creased in the slab, causing the reshores on the 21st floor to fall out. 
The overall condition of the formwork was also evaluated. After 
the collapse, much of the remaining lumber was found to be in poor 
condition or out of plumb, and thus in violation of OSHA. Some of 
the lateral bracing was not properly connected to the formwork 
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 21–26). 
Schlager (1994) noted that the OSHA regulations in effect at the 
time required that for floor spans over (6.1 m) (20 ft), forms needed 
to be left in place for at least 10 days of temperatures exceeding 
10°C (50°F). 
Concrete Strength and Strength Development 
Results of standard ASTM C39 concrete cylinder tests showed ad­
equate strength at 7 and 28 days. However, these were laboratory 
tests, with cylinders stored at a controlled temperature. Particularly 
in cold weather, laboratory tests do not correspond to the strength of 
the concrete in place in a structure. OSHA regulations required field-
cured cylinders, stored at the same temperature as the structure, to 
verify the strength of the structure before removing shores and 
formwork. As part of the investigation, 100-mm (4-in.) diameter 
cores were obtained from the structure. These also showed that the 
Fig. 6. Estimated location of forms and reshores at the time of the collapse (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 30) 
quality of concrete delivered to the project was sufficient to produce 
adequate strength (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 57–59). 
It is well known that cold weather delays gains in concrete 
strength. The maturity method (ASTM 2011) can be used to account 
for this effect. The calculation may be performed in terms of time-
temperature factor (TTF) or equivalent age. To calculate the TTF 
P​MðtÞ ¼  ðTa 2 T0ÞDt ð1Þ 
where MðtÞ 5 time-temperature factor at age t, in degree-days or 
degree-hours; Dt 5 a time interval, in days or hours; Ta 5 average 
concrete temperature during the time interval Dt; and T0 5 datum 
temperature, typically taken as –10°C (14°F) (ACI 2003). 
To calculate equivalent age 
  
1 1 
​te ¼ P e 2Q Ta 2 Ts Dt ð2Þ 
where te 5 equivalent age at specified temperature Ts, in days or 
hours; Q 5 activation energy divided by the gas constant (kelvin), 
often taken as 5,000 K for concrete made with ASTM Type I cement; 
Ts 5 specified temperature, typically 296 K or 23°C (73°F), gen­
erally the temperature of laboratory cured cylinders; and other 
variables are as previously defined (ACI 2003). 
However, it was February, and the ambient temperature ranged 
from –2 to  11°C (28–52°F). This meant two things. First, the 
number of days when construction was suspended because of low 
temperatures was usually at least 1 day per week, and secondly, it 
would take more time for the concrete to gain its required strength. 
For example, sections one, two, and three of the 21st floor were 
placed on February 5th, 6th, and 7th, respectively. However, the 
fourth section of the 21st floor was not placed until a week later on 
February 13th. 
Temperatures recorded at National Airport before the collapse 
suggested that the average air temperature was 5.6°C for the 22nd 
floor and 7°C for the 23rd floor (42 and 45°F, respectively) 
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 60). The temperature history 
is shown in Fig. 7. Concrete cured at (5.6°C) (42°F) for 1 week would 
have a TTF 5 ð5:6 1 10Þ 3 7 5 109°C e days ½ð42 e 14Þ 3 7 5 
196°F e days]. In contrast, concrete cured at the standard laboratory 
temperature of 23°C (73°F) would have a TTF 5 ð23 1 10Þ 3 
7 5 231°C e days ½ð73 e 14Þ 3 7 5 392°F e days]. In other words, 
at 5.6°C (42°F), concrete takes about twice as long to gain strength 
as at standard laboratory temperature. 
In terms of equivalent age, 5.6°C (42°F) 5 279 K 
  P 1 1​ 25;000 2te ¼ e 279 296  7 ¼ 2:5 
Although the two formulas give slightly different results, it is 
reasonable to assume that at 7 days the concrete in a structure at an 
average temperature of 5.6°C (42°F) would be roughly equivalent to 
that of laboratory cylinders at 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 days. 
The concrete contained calcium chloride accelerating admixture, 
at a rate of 2% by weight of cement, to counteract low temperatures. 
It is estimated that the strength of the 23rd floor slab concrete was 
approximately 6.6–9.9 MPa (960–1,440 psi) (Carino et al. 1983). 
Throughout the winter, however, construction of 23 floors had 
proceeded without any evident problems. At some times, the two 
floors supporting a freshly placed slab had a combined age of only 
10 days of equivalent age when considering maturity (Schousboe 
1976). 
Structural Analysis 
At the time of the collapse, three-dimensional elastic finite-element 
(FE) analysis using computers was still a relatively new technology. 
The NBS investigation team used FE analysis to evaluate the slab 
stresses in the region where the collapse occurred, using beam and 
plate elements. Stresses were compared with the provisions of ACI 
Fig. 7. Temperature history (scale 0°F 5 218°C and 60°F 5 15.6°C) (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 63) 
318–71 (ACI 1971). Three different cases were analyzed, with 
different shoring and concrete conditions. Yield line analysis was 
also used. The results showed that even with low-concrete strength, 
a flexural failure of the slab would be unlikely. However, under any 
of the cases where shores had been removed, a punching shear 
failure of the slab would probably occur. Once punching shear 
occurred at any one column, the collapse would rapidly propagate as 
other slab-column joints became overstressed. There was no in­
dication that the crane was a contributing factor to the collapse 
(Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 65–83). 
It should also be noted that by the ACI code (ACI 1971), sand-
lightweight concrete has a 15% lower shear strength than con­
ventional concrete for the same compressive strength. The most 
critical locations for punching shear were found to be at columns 67, 
68, 83, and 84 (Carino et al. 1983). 
Findings from the National Bureau 
of Standards Investigation 
The NBS team concluded that the most likely cause of the collapse 
was a punching shear failure of the 23rd floor slab. The two factors 
that contributed to this were premature removal of shores below the 
23rd floor slab, and the low strength of the 23rd floor concrete in the 
area supporting the weight of the 24th floor slab (Carino et al. 1983). 
Construction did not adhere to the engineer’s requirements that were 
shown in a note on the structural drawings, which were “slab being 
poured to be shored for two floors and backpropped at center of span 
each way and at center of bay on next floor down,” or the architect’s 
specifications requiring “in call cases, two floors shall be fully 
shored.” (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, p. 85). Another investigation 
was carried out that agreed with the findings of the NBS team 
(Schousboe 1976). 
The NBS team also found other instances of failure to comply with 
OSHA regulations. These included premature removal of 22nd story 
shores and failure to use field-cured concrete cylinders to ensure that 
the concrete had achieved sufficient strength before removing shores 
and forms. The shoring did not have proper lateral bracing, and some of 
it was out of plumb and damaged, although this probably did not con­
tribute to the collapse. Inspection that should have noted the problems 
was either not done or the corrections were not made. Some deviations 
in the crane supported lengths were also found, but these probably had 
no bearing on the incident (Leyendecker and Fattal 1977, pp. 85–86). 
Legal and Ethical Implications 
The developer was ordered to temporarily halt construction, and 
a subcontractor was fined $300 for improperly shoring freshly 
poured concrete. At the time, Battiata (1982) noted that company 
officials refused to discuss the incident. 
A number of court cases resulted from this collapse. Most were 
filed within a year or two of the collapse. A criminal trial was the first 
to reach the courts. The vice president of the concrete firm was tried 
for manslaughter, for ordering removal of the formwork. The de­
fendant did not testify, and the case resulted in a hung jury; the jury 
could not be sure that he had ordered removal of enough of the 
formwork to cause collapse (Fairweather 1975). 
The concrete subcontractor paid less than $20,000 in fines, de­
spite the fact that the collapse had caused $8 to $10 million in 
damages, in addition to the deaths and injuries (Schlager 1994). 
Next, the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Workmen’s Compen­
sation legislation provided benefits to the injured and the survivors of 
those killed. As in many states, the benefits were far from adequate. 
For example, a quadriplegic might get as little as $85 a month for life 
(Fairweather 1975). 
The Worker’s Compensation legislation provided immunity to 
subcontractors and in most cases, the general contractor, so they could 
not be sued. However, design professionals such as architects and 
engineers were not protected (Fairweather 1975). 
Therefore, one of the injured construction workers later sued the 
architect and engineer for $500,000. The suit was successful, and the 
plaintiff was awarded the $500,000 at the expense of the engineer 
and architect. The outcome caused considerable concern to the 
architectural and engineering professional societies (Franklin 1975). 
The judge later found the amount excessive and cut it in half 
(Fairweather 1975). 
The designers were blamed for not visiting the project site to 
inspect the construction, despite the fact that it was not part of their 
scope of work (Schlager 1994; Carper and Feld 1997). As Carper 
(2001) noted, “The architect and engineer were thus held responsible 
for the collapse, even though their explicit specifications for re­
quired shoring were not being implemented at the site.” 
Kaminetzky (1991, p. 67) noted that the “collapse raised the issue 
of the extent of the engineer of record’s responsibility for the success 
and safety of formwork design and inspection. While the engineer’s 
contract specifically stated that he had no responsibility for field 
inspection, nevertheless a jury found him negligent. This was so 
because the pertinent code required that ‘a competent architect or 
engineer’ must provide supervision ‘where requested by the building 
official’.” Often, owners are not willing to pay engineers for the site 
visits. Some jurisdictions now require owners to pay for inspection. 
Educational Aspects 
Schlager (1994) believed that this collapse called attention to some 
endemic problems of the U.S. construction industry. The first is that 
project contractors and subcontractors are responsible for temporary 
works, such as formwork and shoring, although they may not know 
much about construction loading or structural design. The project 
structural engineers, who may have that knowledge, are normally 
not involved in the design of temporary works. A second is that the 
field implementation of a design depends on construction quality 
control, and the degree of care in inspection can vary from project to 
project. The third is that excessive speed of construction can be 
dangerous. The Portland Cement Association (PCA) and the ACI 
both used this case to improve building codes and structural safety. 
Kaminetzky (1991, p. 67) cited six lessons from this case: 
•	 The contractor should be responsible for preparing formwork 
drawings, including shores and reshores; 
•	 The contractor should prepare a detailed concrete testing plan for 
stripping forms, including cylinder tests; 
•	 Inspectors and other quality control agencies should verify that 
the contractor performs the previous two items; 
•	 The Engineer of Record (EOR) should make sure he/she provides 
the contractor with all necessary design load data and other unique 
project information; 
•	 Uncontrolled acceleration of formwork removal may cause a 
total or partial collapse; and 
•	 Continuous top and bottom slab reinforcement is necessary around 
the columns. Continuous reinforcement provides overall ductility. 
If the contractor uses cylinder tests to determine when to strip 
forms during cold weather, the cylinders should be stored at the same 
ambient temperature as the structure. This will prevent over­
estimation of the in-place concrete strength. 
This case study is of relevance to a number of engineering 
courses. For a course in concrete materials, it illustrates how the 
strength gain of concrete is hampered in cold weather. Courses in 
construction can also use this collapse to indicate the importance of 
structural integrity of formwork and of control of shore removal and 
reshoring. 
Conclusion 
“The NBS investigation concluded that the probable cause of 
the collapse was a punching shear failure of the 23rd floor. . .  The 
premature removal of forms supporting the 23rd story slab when the 
concrete of that slab had a relatively low strength produced shear 
stresses in excess of the concrete capacity at the time of the 
incident. . .Most of the eyewitness reports indicated deflection in the 
23rd and 24th story slabs [varying from 6 in. to 2 ft (152 mm to 
0.6 m)] which increased over a 15 or 20 min time period before 
failure. . . The loss of support from any one of these columns led to 
overstressing of the slab around the remaining columns and the 
failure propagated through the 23rd floor until a stable configuration 
remained. The accumulation and impact of falling debris from the 
collapsing 23rd and 24th floors overloaded the 22nd floor slab and 
induced the progressive collapse of successive floors down to the 
ground” (Carino et al. 1983, p. 41). 
Schousboe (1976) concluded that “The errors committed on the 
Skyline Project at Bailey’s Crossroads have all been previously 
encountered in the history of construction failures. The structure was 
nothing out of the ordinary; this type of building had been suc­
cessfully erected many times all over this country. The failure was 
conceived with a human decision and order to remove formwork 
without a well-founded estimate of the strength attained by the 
concrete, and was born when the order was carried out.” 
Following this incident, Fairfax County, Virginia, was one of the 
first jurisdictions to adopt a formal critical structures program. These 
programs required preconstruction conferences to define re­
sponsibilities before work begins. The determination of critical 
structures is based on type of construction, building type, and height, 
such as posttensioned buildings or structural steel buildings over 
3 stories in height (“Inspection programs” 1987). 
Despite the fact that this collapse occurred nearly four decades 
ago, the lessons learned are still relevant. Formwork collapses still 
occur, although usually on a smaller scale. Safe control of concrete 
construction still requires a knowledge of concrete strength gain, and 
of proper formwork design and proper control of shoring removal 
and reshoring operations. 
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